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?I. Introduction
This paper compares the information contents of the macroeconomic forecasts produced by two
major public sector forecasters, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), during 1994−2003. In particular, it first provides
an overall assessment of the relative accuracy of IMF, OECD and Consensus (private sector) forecasts,
and then tests whether the release of public sector forecasts had systematic impact on subsequent
revisions in Consensus forecasts1. The paper adds to the literature by shedding light on whether public
sector institutions provide new information to private sector forecasters of macroeconomic variables.
* The authors have benefited from the useful comments of Professor Michael Artis and Dr. Philip Hubbard on an earlier
draft. However, we remain solely responsible for the views expressed and any remaining errors.
? Graduate School of Economics, Osaka University.
? Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
1 Consensus forecasts are provided by Consensus Economics, Inc., a U.K.−based private company that has regularly
been publishing the mean forecasts of major private sector forecasters since 1990.
Comparing the Information Contents of IMF
and OECD Macroeconomic Forecasts?
Shinji Takagi† and Halim Kucur‡
Abstract
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?The uniqueness of IMF macroeconomic forecasts comes from the near−universal character of the
institution2. The IMF’s forecasts therefore reflect both its knowledge of individual economies (which it
monitors on a regular basis) and its understanding of the interlinkages between them. The IMF’s
knowledge of economic developments and prospects in individual countries may not be as intimate as
that of national authorities or local forecasters, but it has a distinct advantage in understanding how
they interact with each other across borders. Because forecasts for all countries are produced
simultaneously, moreover, IMF forecasts presumably satisfy the general equilibrium constraints that
are binding for the world economy, at least to a greater extent than comparable forecasts produced by
other institutions. As such, IMF forecasts receive wide attention when they are released to the public3.
Likewise, the OECD’s forecasts share the advantage of having multilateral perspectives. Unlike the
IMF, however, its membership is much smaller, limited mostly to industrial countries. Given their
more limited coverage of countries, it is therefore of interest to investigate whether the OECD’s
forecasts are in some sense outperformed by the IMF forecasts, even for the OECD member countries.
As a larger question, we are also interested in knowing whether private sector forecasters find value in
the forecasts produced by public international organizations. Batchelor (2001) approached the
question of usefulness of IMF and OECD forecasts from the standpoint of their ability to improve the
accuracy of private sector forecasts. In this paper, we approach this question in terms of whether or not
private sector forecasts have a tendency to move towards IMF or OECD forecasts when they are
released. In pursuing this line of investigation, we also incorporate the possibility of herding behavior,
as noted previously by Blix et al. (2001) and Gallo et al. (2002) in the context of private sector
forecasters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the data used in this study. Section III
provides an overall assessment of IMF and OECD macroeconomic forecasts by comparing them to
each other as well as to the forecasts provided by Consensus Economics, Inc. Section IV tests the
information content of IMF and OECD forecasts by identifying their impact on Consensus private
sector forecasts. Section V presents concluding remarks. Finally, Appendix I lists the sample
countries, Appendix II explains the matching of Consensus forecasts with IMF and OECD forecasts,
Appendix III provides a breakdown of Consensus forecasters used in our restricted sample, and
Appendix IV reports the results obtained from bootstrapped data.
II. Data
The IMF and OECD regularly publish macroeconomic forecasts on member and other countries in
their semiannual reports, World Economic Outlook (WEO) and OECD Economic Outlook (OEO),
respectively; the WEO is released in or around April and September, and the OEO in or around June
2 The IMF has over 180 member countries.
3 According to data supplied to the authors by the IMF’s External Relations Department, during 2005, there were about
3500 press references world−wide to the semiannual World Economic Outlook report. It is believed that many of these
references related to the macroeconomic forecasts released therein.
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?and December. We use the WEO’s April issues to obtain the IMF’s current−year forecasts, and the
September issues for its one year−ahead forecasts; likewise, we use the OEO’s June issues to obtain
the OECD’s current−year forecasts, and the December issues for its year−ahead forecasts.
For the purpose of this study, we focus our attention on real GDP growth and inflation forecasts for
1994−2003 (1991−2003 for relative accuracy tests). The time series of the realized values are taken
from the April 2004 issue of the WEO for both growth and inflation4. For the OECD’s inflation
forecasts, we use the time−series of the GDP−based private consumption price index, taken from the
OEO. We obtain the realized values of the OECD inflation forecasts from the December 2005 issue of
the OEO.
In order to secure a balanced set of data with at least 10 observations for each country, we have
restricted the sample to 33 countries for which Consensus Economics has consistently provided
forecasts at least since 1994, including G7 countries, 12 countries in (non−G7) Europe, 7 countries in
the Asia−Pacific region, and another 7 countries in Latin America (see Appendix I). Although
Consensus Economics now provides forecasts for Eastern European countries, we do not include this
region because the series are not long enough to provide 10 observations. Because the OECD
produces forecasts for a smaller set of countries, tests involving OECD forecasts are naturally based
on a subset of the 33 countries. In tests of relative accuracy, Consensus forecasts are chosen so as to
best match the timing of the release of IMF and OECD forecasts (see Appendix II).
III. Tests of Relative Accuracy of IMF and OECD Forecasts
Both IMF and OECD forecasts have been a subject of considerable research. As to IMF forecasts,
most previous research has generally found them little different from private sector forecasts (Artis,
1997; Loungani, 2000; Timmermann, 2006), but some idiosyncratic differences have also been noted
in a few cases. Timmermann (2006), for example, found that the IMF’s current−year growth forecasts
were generally less biased than Consensus forecasts, but the reverse was true for one year−ahead
forecasts. Batchelor (2001) reported that, during 1990−99, Consensus mean forecasts were somewhat
more accurate and less biased than IMF (as well as OECD) forecasts (see also Juhn and Loungani,
2002).
It is well known in the literature that an aggregation of individual forecasts tends to perform better
than its components (Clemen, 1989). Comparing to individual (as opposed to Consensus mean)
forecasts, Blix et al (2001) concluded that IMF forecasts were less accurate than those produced by
about 70 percent of private forecasters for the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and
Sweden during the 1990s. The corresponding share of private forecasters who performed better than
the OECD (for growth forecasts only) was around 60 percent. Among the private forecasters, these
4 Some studies have used the actual numbers obtained from the next available publication for each year. A formal test
indicates that the difference between the actual numbers so obtained and the April 2004 numbers is not statistically
significant.
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?authors report that only 30 percent of them performed better than the Consensus mean. This may
explain part of the reason why Consensus mean forecasts are often found to perform better than IMF
or OECD forecasts.
An additional factor that works against public sector forecasts may be the possible political
constraints. These public institutions may well share the tendency of national governments to be
upbeat about the performance of their economies. In the case of the IMF, for example, it has been
found that forecasts are optimistic for countries that are under its lending programs. These weaknesses
of public sector forecasts may in part be offset by their stronger multilateral orientation and lack of
potential profit incentives. This is an empirical question.
A quick review of the mean errors (MEs) of Consensus, IMF, and OECD forecasts suggests that,
during 1991−2004, the current−year forecasts had an overall pessimistic tendency––indicated by
negative average errors for growth and positive average errors for inflation (Table 1). The pessimistic
tendency for growth is particularly pronounced for larger economies. In the case of one year−ahead
forecasts, on the other hand, the pessimism for growth is much less pronounced, with the notable
exception of the United States (Table 2). In fact, for most countries, the forecasts even take on an
optimistic tendency when the forecast horizon is lengthened. Inflation forecasts for the most part
remain pessimistic.
In terms of root mean squared errors (RMSEs), the OECD’s current−year forecasts for growth
outperformed the others in 19 out of the 23 countries (for which the OECD provided forecasts)5. These
observations do not change whether the OECD forecasts are compared with the May or April
Consensus forecasts6. For inflation, the Consensus current−year forecasts outperformed the OECD
forecasts in 14 countries. In either case, the IMF’s growth forecasts performed rather poorly, except in
non−G7 European countries where they outperformed the Consensus forecasts in 9 out of the 12 cases
(though they did not outperform the OECD forecasts, except for the Netherlands and Portugal). The
results for inflation are more mixed, but the IMF was the worst performer in 10 of the 23 countries for
which all three forecasters provided forecasts.
Turning to the year−ahead inflation forecasts, the IMF’s performance improves relative to the
Consensus forecasts for G7 countries and the Asia−Pacific region. The IMF’s forecasts for five of the
G7 countries and six of the 7 Asia−Pacific countries are better than the Consensus mean forecasts.
Relative to the OECD, the performance is still poor. For growth forecasts, the Consensus and OECD
forecasts again performed better for most regions. The Consensus forecasts outperformed the OECD
forecasts for inflation, while neither dominated the other for growth forecasts. It should be noted,
however, that any difference that may exist in terms of these statistics is not very large and the
assessment of relative performance might change depending on the time period.
5 Root mean squared errors (RMSEs) and mean absolute errors (MAEs) are the most widely used statistics to make
inference on the relative accuracy of two forecast series. Following Öller and Barot (2000), we do not report MAEs
because they tend to duplicate the results obtained from the RMSE statistics.
6 The statements comparing the two sets of forecasts in this section are based on the May Consensus forecasts, although
these are not explicitly reported in the tables.
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?A different picture of the relative performance of the IMF and OECD forecasts emerges, however,
when we compare them with the mean of the private sector forecasts for individual G7 countries in the
restricted Consensus sample (that includes only those forecasters that consistently provided forecasts
over the period––see Appendix III). The MEs of the private sector forecasts in the restricted sample
suggest that the growth pessimism for the G7 countries weakens, and the forecasts even become
optimistic in some cases (Table 3). The RMSEs, moreover, are larger than those of the Consensus
means, and exceed those of the IMF and OECD forecasts. The IMF (as well as the OECD) actually
Table 1. Forecast Errors of Current−Year Consensus, IMF, and OECD Forecasts, 1991−2003
A. Growth B. Inflation
Mean Errors Root Mean Squared Errors Mean Errors Root Mean Squared Errors
Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD
United States −0.34 −0.41 −0.24 1.06 1.09 0.94 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.39 0.33
Japan −0.32 −0.23 −0.21 1.10 1.08 0.90 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.35 0.43 0.42
Germany −0.91 −0.77 −0.82 3.72 3.64 3.63 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.52 0.48 0.67
France 0.29 0.26 0.20 0.77 0.81 0.65 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.34 0.57
United Kingdom −0.43 −0.50 −0.51 0.93 0.96 0.93 0.47 0.59 0.13 0.96 1.06 0.74
Italy 0.29 0.30 0.26 0.72 0.82 0.65 −0.04 −0.03 −0.31 0.43 0.47 0.46
Canada −0.11 −0.14 −0.11 1.21 1.31 1.14 0.06 −0.04 0.18 0.45 0.54 0.50
Netherlands −0.20 −0.16 −0.19 1.13 1.12 1.15 −0.02 −0.03 −0.13 0.51 0.58 0.38
Norway −0.85 −0.11 −0.30 1.42 1.31 1.09 0.38 0.31 0.25 0.57 0.60 0.39
Spain −0.13 −0.10 −0.13 0.92 0.92 0.77 −0.12 −0.29 −0.19 0.42 0.64 0.36
Sweden −0.29 −0.25 −0.29 1.34 1.22 1.07 0.15 0.50 0.11 0.65 0.89 0.58
Switzerland 0.69 0.51 0.46 1.22 1.10 1.00 0.22 0.15 0.32 0.63 0.48 0.60
Austria −0.06 −0.08 −0.22 0.91 0.89 0.83 0.27 0.23 0.13 0.52 0.57 0.95
Belgium 0.03 0.09 −0.03 1.18 1.11 1.00 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.53 0.52 0.80
Denmark 0.05 0.07 0.09 1.24 1.32 0.98 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.37 0.45 0.56
Finland 0.54 0.64 0.43 2.66 2.79 1.85 0.45 0.46 −0.06 0.84 0.85 0.98
Greece −0.55 −0.45 −0.45 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.99 0.84 −0.12 2.95 2.91 0.44
Ireland −1.94 −1.53 −1.30 2.97 2.70 2.41 0.10 0.04 0.34 0.77 0.77 1.48
Portugal 0.16 0.20 0.13 1.06 0.87 0.88 0.15 0.13 −0.06 0.82 0.77 0.33
Australia −0.29 −0.41 −0.35 0.93 1.18 0.90 0.42 0.71 0.48 0.93 1.49 0.67
Indonesia −0.09 −0.12 − 2.49 2.92 − −0.73 −0.88 − 3.83 4.63 −
Malaysia −0.28 −0.35 − 3.24 3.61 − 0.70 0.49 − 1.06 1.18 −
New Zealand −0.22 −0.08 −0.21 1.62 1.90 1.49 0.21 0.05 0.27 0.63 0.59 0.57
Singapore −0.69 −1.00 − 3.66 3.93 − 0.65 0.54 − 0.98 0.99 −
Korea −0.23 −0.44 0.56 2.59 3.02 3.27 0.64 0.50 0.08 1.18 1.30 1.69
Thailand 0.48 0.55 − 3.13 3.46 − 0.72 0.96 − 1.50 1.67 −
Argentina 0.22 0.18 − 3.19 3.78 − 4.37 1.48 − 11.46 2.93 −
Brazil −0.04 0.07 − 1.93 2.41 − −126.70 −139 − 262.31 299.99 −
Chile −0.07 −0.13 − 2.01 2.28 − 0.02 −0.15 − 0.36 0.70 −
Mexico −0.06 0.03 0.44 1.80 2.03 2.07 0.09 −1.80 0.00 4.31 2.61 3.27
Venezuela 0.29 0.10 − 3.39 4.23 − 1.55 −2.60 − 8.80 7.78 −
Colombia 0.76 0.91 − 2.07 1.99 − 0.29 −0.22 − 1.60 1.50 −
Peru −0.52 −0.27 − 2.98 3.61 − −4.78 −6.73 − 12.21 15.85 −
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?performed better relative to the smaller set of continuously engaged private forecasters in individual
G7 countries7.
7 This contrasts with the results earlier reported by Blix et al (2001), which likely reflected their choice of the May
Consensus survey. We believe this choice is inappropriate. The IMF’s forecasts should be compared with the April
Consensus forecasts.
Table 2. Forecast Errors of Year−Ahead Consensus, IMF, and OECD Forecasts, 1992−2003
A. Growth B. Inflation
Mean Errors Root Mean Squared Errors Mean Errors Root Mean Squared Errors
Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD Consensus IMF OECD
United States −0.51 −0.68 −0.76 1.50 1.49 1.62 0.36 0.30 0.20 0.61 0.61 0.59
Japan 0.48 0.82 0.22 1.78 1.82 1.53 0.34 0.37 0.17 0.58 0.69 0.62
Germany 0.86 1.13 0.73 1.49 1.71 1.30 0.26 0.09 0.46 0.77 0.76 0.70
France 0.69 0.79 0.48 1.52 1.56 1.20 0.25 0.05 0.35 0.66 0.63 0.66
United Kingdom −0.22 −0.15 −0.33 1.01 1.06 1.08 1.03 0.88 0.38 1.10 1.04 0.90
Italy 0.83 0.89 0.50 1.38 1.33 0.99 −0.15 −0.24 −0.49 0.74 0.94 0.99
Canada −0.05 0.02 −0.13 1.75 1.77 1.72 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.94 0.72 0.60
Netherlands 0.26 0.17 0.05 1.56 1.48 1.43 0.03 0.09 −0.04 0.80 0.80 0.48
Norway −0.72 −0.42 −0.40 1.50 1.53 1.50 0.45 0.34 0.25 1.03 0.89 0.70
Spain 0.27 0.27 0.01 1.40 1.23 1.08 −0.09 −0.32 −0.25 0.58 0.81 0.67
Sweden 0.17 0.19 −0.29 1.82 1.65 1.55 0.43 0.37 0.28 1.32 1.07 1.15
Switzerland 1.08 1.08 0.62 1.61 1.58 1.25 0.69 0.57 0.57 0.98 0.88 0.90
Austria 0.54 0.51 0.25 1.29 1.37 1.07 0.39 0.37 0.15 0.73 0.67 0.95
Belgium 0.53 0.51 0.32 1.63 1.66 1.43 0.30 0.12 0.19 0.72 0.74 0.81
Denmark 0.31 0.18 0.28 1.59 1.71 1.41 0.28 0.25 0.45 0.63 0.54 0.75
Finland 0.38 0.68 0.16 2.41 2.34 2.35 0.76 0.73 −0.25 1.24 1.23 1.43
Greece −0.42 −0.42 −0.35 0.61 0.64 0.63 1.15 0.69 −0.15 3.08 2.93 0.83
Ireland −2.33 −1.94 −2.00 3.63 3.26 3.03 0.07 −0.17 0.07 1.16 1.30 1.53
Portugal 0.67 0.81 0.44 1.76 1.77 1.28 0.37 −0.03 −0.08 1.17 0.89 0.51
Australia −0.27 −0.32 −0.43 0.97 1.10 1.11 0.20 0.64 0.81 1.72 1.70 1.08
Indonesia 1.28 1.28 − 5.85 5.78 − 1.63 −4.47 − 22.28 14.98 −
Malaysia 0.30 0.18 − 5.05 5.05 − 0.67 1.14 − 1.44 1.97 −
New Zealand −0.65 −0.81 −0.58 1.69 2.33 1.87 −0.02 −0.25 −0.48 0.69 0.59 1.16
Singapore −0.19 −0.83 − 4.89 4.75 − 0.70 0.56 − 1.28 1.21 −
Korea 0.60 0.49 0.41 5.03 5.21 6.62 0.78 0.22 −0.76 2.75 1.78 1.32
Thailand 1.19 1.26 − 4.89 5.36 − 0.86 0.68 − 2.82 1.96 −
Argentina 2.16 2.46 − 6.07 6.60 − 1.73 2.04 − 12.69 13.63 −
Brazil 0.29 0.55 − 2.17 2.36 − −128.86 −215 − 347.67 534.78 −
Chile 0.38 0.61 − 2.50 2.83 − 0.18 0.16 − 0.67 1.00 −
Mexico 1.14 1.64 1.25 3.71 3.72 4.13 −3.84 −4.02 −4.89 9.22 9.24 10.89
Venezuela 2.83 3.22 − 5.51 6.03 − −6.56 −10 − 17.55 18.38 −
Colombia 1.33 1.33 − 2.56 2.54 − 0.52 0.88 − 2.35 2.67 −
Peru 0.04 0.96 − 3.71 4.35 − −0.64 −3.47 − 5.58 10.10 −
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?IV. Testing the Information Content of IMF and OECD Forecasts
Identifying the information value of public sector forecasts to private sector forecasters is a difficult
task because there are multiple factors that must be taken account of, including the question of when
new information arrives and posssible herding behavior among private forecasters. In this section, we
attempt to do this by identifying how private sector forecasts react when new forecasts are released by
the IMF or the OECD. Controling for the arrival of new information is made tractable by the much
higher (monthly) frequency of Consensus forecasts relative to the (semiannual) frequency of IMF and
OECD forecasts. As to herding behavior, several studies have suggested that individual private sector
forecasts tend to converge to the Consensus mean over time (Blix et al., 2001; Gallo et al., 2002). We
control for the possible herding behavior by including, as an explanatory variable, a term showing the
reaction of the immediately preceding Consensus forecast to the previous Consensus forecast, as
explained below.
In particular, we estimate (in the case of IMF forecasts) the following equation:
CONS i t2  CONS i t1 1 IMF i t  CONS i t1  2 CONS i t1  CONS i t0  ui t (1)
Table 3. Forecast Errors of Current−Year Consensus, IMF, and OECD Forecasts, 1991−2003
A. Growth
Mean Errors (MEs) Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSEs)
Consensus RestrictedConsensus1 IMF OECD Consensus
Restricted
Consensus1 IMF OECD
United States −0.34 −0.23 −0.41 −0.24 1.06 1.69 1.09 0.94
Japan −0.32 0.57 −0.23 −0.21 1.10 1.54 1.08 0.90
Germany −0.91 −0.11 −0.77 −0.82 3.72 3.95 3.64 3.63
France 0.29 0.94 0.26 0.20 0.77 1.47 0.81 0.65
United Kingdom −0.43 0.18 −0.50 −0.51 0.93 1.37 0.96 0.93
Italy 0.29 0.97 0.30 0.26 0.72 1.30 0.82 0.65
Canada −0.11 0.38 −0.14 −0.11 1.21 2.22 1.31 1.14
B. Inflation
Mean Errors (MEs) Root Mean Squared Errors (RMSEs)
Consensus RestrictedConsensus1 IMF OECD Consensus
Restricted
Consensus1 IMF OECD
United States 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.27 0.59 0.39 0.33
Japan 0.07 0.13 0.17 0.00 0.35 0.67 0.43 0.42
Germany 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.43 0.52 0.85 0.48 0.67
France 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.22 0.37 0.52 0.34 0.57
United Kingdom 0.47 0.69 0.59 0.13 0.96 1.40 1.06 0.74
Italy −0.04 −0.34 −0.03 −0.31 0.43 0.58 0.47 0.46
Canada 0.08 0.20 0.05 0.18 0.27 0.59 0.39 0.5
Note: 1. The restricted Consensus sample includes only those private sector forecasters that consistently provided
forecasts in Consensus surveys in April from 1991. See Appendix III.
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?where, for country i and year t , IMF refers to the relevant IMF forecast, CONS 1 is the Consensus
forecast immediately preceding the release of the IMF forecast, and CONS 0 and CONS 2 are the
relevant Consensus forecasts immediately before and after CONS 1, respectively;  , 1 , 2 are
coefficients to be estimated; and u is an error term. Likewise, we use an analogous regression equation
to test the impact of OECD forecasts, as follows:
CONS it2  CONS it1  1 OECD it  CONS it1  2 CONS it1  CONS it0  vit (2)
where OECD is the relevant OECD forecast, v is an error term, and all other variables are analogously
defined. As noted, the second term in both equation (1) and equation (2) is designed to capture the
possible herding behavior among private forecasters. We expect 1 to be positive and statistically
significant if the IMF (or OECD) provides new information to private forecasters.
Given the limited sample size, we estimate equation (1) or (2) by using a GLS panel−data estimator,
which has the added advantage of yielding a weighted average of the within−group and between−
group estimators (to indicate the overall impact of IMF or OECD forecasts). The GLS panel−data
estimator is also designed to adjust forecast revisions by the standard deviations, thus taking into
account the underlying forecasting difficulty for individual countries. As robustness checks, we report
the results of estimating these equations by three additional estimators: (i) an OLS Prais−Winsten
estimator (which is more suitable for a fixed T ); a pooled OLS estimator; and (iii) a Generalized
Estimating Equations (GEE) estimator. In all these cases, we control for serial correlation and a
heteroskedastic error structure accounting for cross−country differences8. Bootstrapping is used to
generate 1000 replications, as an additional robustness check. The results from the bootstrapped data
are reported in Appendix IV.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (1) for IMF forecasts by various methods (the
term IMF−CON 1 is simply denoted as IMF in the table). All in all, they indicate that, during 1994−
2003, the estimated coefficient1 is positive and statistically significant for Europe and (for inflation
only) the Asia−Pacific region. On the other hand, the IMF forecasts did not seem to have impact on
private sector forecasts for G7 countries and Latin America. In the light of the results reported in
Section III, these findings may mean that the IMF has greater impact on a region for which it provides
relatively more accurate forecasts (recall that the IMF’s forecasts for these regions were found to be
more accurate than for the other regions).
For year−ahead forecasts, we find that the IMF forecasts had impact on private sector forecasts for
Latin America as well. On the other hand, we do not observe a positive impact on private sector
forecasters in G7 economies, where the IMF had relatively better performance in year−ahead inflation
forecasts (at least in five of the countries). These results suggest that producing better forecasts is not a
sufficient condition for the IMF to have impact on private sector forecasters. It is possible that private
sector forecasters are giving more weight to the IMF’s views on regions for which, given a longer
8 GLS panel−data estimators yield similar results when we allow for panel−specific or common autocorrelation in errors.
For this reason, we only report the results obtained by allowing for panel−specific autocorrrelated errors.
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horizon, information is more limited.
Table 5 reports the results of estimating equation (2) for OECD forecasts (the term OECD−CON 1 is
simply denoted as OECD in the table). The results on the impact of OECD forecasts are not
conclusive when all OECD countries are considered: GLS and GEE estimators yield statistically
significant coefficient estimates (only GLS for growth forecasts), but this is not supported by the OLS
pooled and Prais−Winsten estimators. We find more consistent results for the smaller groupings: the
OECD’s current−year and year−ahead forecasts had impact on private sector forecasts for non−G7
Europe, but not for G7 countries. In the case of G7 countries, we again observe that better forecasts
did not necessarily lead to greater impact on private sector forecasts (recall that the OECD had more
accurate forecasts than the IMF forecasts for the G7 countries).
In both sets of results, there is strong evidence of herding behavior among private forecasters. In
three regions (Europe, the G7 and Asia−Pacific), the estimated coefficient of the term CON 1−CON 0
(simply denoted as Lag in both tables) is positive and statistically significant, both for growth and
inflation, during the months in which the IMF provided forecasts. Similar findings are observed for
the OECD forecasts, although the evidence for inflation is somewhat weaker. These results on the
informational content of public sector forecasts and herding behavior among private sector forecasters
are generally robust to bootstrapping across all estimation methods for the IMF’s and OECD’s
current−year and year−ahead forecasts, with only a few exceptions (see also Appendix IV, Tables A1
and A2).
Table 4. Impact of IMF Forecasts on Consensus Forecasts, 1994−20031
A. Current−Year B. Year−Ahead
I. Growth II. Inflation I. Growth II. Inflation
OLS GLS OLSP−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE
G7 Constant 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.05 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.06 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Lag ( 2) 0.35 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.34 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.34
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.05)
Europe Constant −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF ( 1 ) 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Lag ( 2) 0.38 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.20
(0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Asia−
Pacific Constant 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 −0.08 −0.03 −0.10 −0.07 −0.11 −0.08 −0.10 −0.11 0.00 −0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.02 −0.03 −0.05 −0.01 0.52 0.42 0.53 0.53 −0.05 −0.08 −0.07 −0.06 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.20
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.17) (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Lag ( 2) 0.55 0.47 0.55 0.57 0.99 0.78 0.89 0.86 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.45 0.78 0.50 0.81 0.81
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.32) (0.14) (0.22) (0.29) (0.15) (0.04) (0.08) (0.12) (0.39) (0.15) (0.23) (0.36)
Latin
America Constant −0.05 0.01 0.00 −0.05 −0.07 −0.18 0.08 −0.09 −0.28 −0.24 −0.26 −0.28 0.37 0.09 0.26 0.37
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.56) (0.09) (0.44) (0.34) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.34) (0.16) (0.37) (0.47)
IMF ( 1 ) 0.01 −0.08 −0.01 0.01 −0.04 −0.11 −0.03 −0.03 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.03) (0.09) (0.18) (0.15) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lag ( 2) 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.28) (0.14) (0.15) (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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V. Conclusion
The macroeconomic forecasts provided by the IMF, the OECD, and Consensus Economics during
1991−2003 were close to each other, but the OECD forecasts were somewhat better for growth and
the Consensus forecasts likewise outperformed the others for inflation. When different groups of
countries were considered, the IMF forecasts performed better for Europe and, to a lesser extent, for
the Asia−Pacific region (in the case of year−ahead forecasts only). All three sets of forecasts had a
pessimistic bias for industrial countries over the current year horizon, but the pessimism almost
dissappeared for growth when the forecasting horizon was lengthened to one−year ahead.
Our analysis for 1994−2003 indicated that the IMF’s forecasts had a positive impact on private
sector forecasts for non−G7 Europe, the Asia−Pacific region (for inflation only), and Latin America
(for year−ahead forecasts only). It may be that private forecasters give greater weight to information
provided by the IMF on regions for which its forecasts are known to be more accurate or for which
information is less available. On the other hand, the OECD forecasts had positive impact on private
sector forecasts in non−G7 European countries, but not in the G7 countries, despite the fact that the
OECD forecasts performed better than the IMF forecasts. Further research is needed to identify what
determines the information value of public sector forecasts to private sector forecasters.
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Appendix I. Sample Countries1
G7 Europe Asia−Pacific Latin America
United States* Netherlands* Australia* Argentina
Japan* Norway* Indonesia Brazil
Germany* Spain* Malaysia Chile
France* Sweden* New Zealand* Mexico*
United Kingdom* Switzerland* Singapore Venezuela
Italy* Austria* Korea* Colombia
Canada* Belgium* Thailand Peru
Denmark*
Finland*
Greece*
Ireland*
Portugal*
Note: 1. The countries included in tests involving OECD forecasts are indicated by an asterisk.
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?Selection of Consensus Forecasts for Relative Accuracy Tests, 1991−2003
Comparison with IMF forecasts Comparison with OECD forecasts
Current−year forecasts, 1991−2003 April1 May2
Year−ahead forecasts, 1992−2003 September3 November4
Selection of Consensus Current−Year Forecasts for Impact Tests in Equation (1), 1994−2003
Time of survey t0 t1 t2
Latin America February1 April2 June3
All others March4 April5 May6
Selection of Consensus Year−Ahead Forecasts for Impact Tests in Equation (1), 1994−2003
Time of survey t0 t1 t2
Latin America June1 August2 October
All others August3 September4 October5
Appendix II. Matching the Consensus Forecasts with IMF and OECD Forecasts
How to match monthly Consensus forecasts with the appropriate semiannual IMF and OECD
forecasts is a critical element of our empirical strategy, because the timing of the release of these
forecasts is not perfectly synchronized. In order to determine the most appropriate choice of
Consensus forecasts, it is important to know the sequence by which IMF and OECD forecasts are
produced and released to the public9.
Both IMF and OECD forecasts involve three critical dates: (i) cut−off date for data and information;
(ii) date of release to the public, through a press conference or the website; and (iii) date of publication
in printed format. We follow Lenain (2002) and use the second date as the date on which forecasts are
deemed released for the purpose of this analysis, i.e., April and September (with a few exceptions in
the early 1990s) for the IMF forecasts, and May and November for the OECD forecasts. The
Consensus forecasts that are used to test the relative accuracy of the IMF and OECD forecasts are as
follows:
Notes: 1. May for Latin America, 1993; 2. June for Latin America, 1991−92, 1994−2000; 3. October for Latin America,
1992−2000; 4. December for Latin America, 1992−2000.
In assessing the impact of IMF or OECD forecasts on private sector forecasts, we use three
Consensus surveys: (i) the survey immediately before the release of IMF or OECD forecasts (at time
t1 ); (ii) the last survey before t1 (at time t0); and (iii) the first survey following t1 (at time t2). The
IMF’s April and the OECD’s May forecasts occasionally preceded the respective release of Consensus
surveys, creating some irregularities in the choice of Consensus forecasts, as follows:
Notes: 1. previous December, 1993, 1998, and 2000; 2. March, 1993 and 2002−03; February, 1998 and 2000; 3. May,
1993 and 2001; April, 1998, 2000, and 2002−03; 4. February, 1998 and 2000; 5. March, 1998 and 2000; 6. April,
1998 and 2000.
Notes: 1. May, 1993; August, 2001−02; 2. July, 1993; September, 2001−02; 3. September, 1995 and 2001; 4. October,
1995 and 2001; 5. November, 1995 and 2001.
9 This, however, ignores the possibility that some of the individual forecasts included in the Consensus surveys are in
fact prepared much before the release of the Consensus forecasts for each month.
? 280 ? Vol.58 No.2OSAKA ECONOMIC PAPERS
?Selection of Consensus Current−Year Forecasts for Impact Tests in Equation (2), 1994−2003
Time of survey t0 t1 t2
Latin America February1 April2 June3
All others April4 May5 June6
Selection of Consensus Year−Ahead Forecasts for Impact Tests in Equation (2), 1994−2003
Time of survey t0 t1 t2
Latin America August1 October2 December3
All others October4 November5 December6
Notes: 1. April, 1996 and 2001; March, 2002−03; 2. June, 1996; April, 2002−03; 3. July, 1996; May, 2002−03; 4. May,
1996; March, 2002−03; 5. June, 1996; April, 2002−03; 6. July, 1996; May, 2002−03.
Notes: 1. October, 1993 and 1995; September 2001−02; 2. December, 1993 and 1995; 3. following february, 1994 and
1996; 4. November, 1993 and 1995; 5. December, 1993 and 1995; 6. following January, 1993 and 1995.
Appendix III. Restricted Consensus Sample
In some applications, we use a restricted sample of private forecasters, which consists of firms or
institutions that participated in Consensus surveys for at least ten years between 1991 and 2003, as
follows:
Forecasters included in the Restricted Consensus Sample, 1991−2003
United States Toyota BNP Banque Paribas Canada
Chemical Bank UBS Banque D’Orsay Bank of Montreal (BMO)
DuPont Credit Lyonnais BMO Nesbitt Burns
Eaton Corporation Germany COE−CCIP Caisse de dépôt
Credit Suisse First Boston Bankgesellschaft Berlin/Berliner Bank GAMA Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC)
Global Insight/WEFA Bayerische Landesbank JP Morgan Chase Conference Board of Canada
Ford BHF Bank OFCE CIBC Wood Gundy
General Motors Commerzbank Rexecode/Ipecode National Bank of Canada
Griggs & Santow Delbrück & Co Societe Generale Richardson Greenshields
JP Morgan Chase Deutsche Bank Total Fina Elf Royal Bank of Canada (RBC)
Merrill Lynch DGZ Dekabank RBC Dominion Securities
Northern Trust Dresdner Bank United Kingdom Royal Trust
Standard & Poor’s DZ Bank/DG Bank Barclays Bank Scotiabank
United States Trust FAZ Institute Cambridge Econometrics
Wells Capital Helaba Frankfurt Citigroup Italy
Wachovia/First Union/CoreStates Financial HSBC Trinkaus & Burkhardt Confederation of British Industries Banca Intea/Banca Commerciale−Cariplo
Hoechst AG Goldman Sachs Centro Europa Ricerche
Japan HypoVereinsbank HSBC/James Capel Confindustria
Mizuho/DKB−Fuji−IBJ IfW−Kiel Liverpool Macroecon Research ENI
Daiwa Institute MMWarburg JP Morgan Chase Fiat SpA
JP Morgan Chase Sal Oppenheim Lehman Brothers ISCO−ISAE
Merrill Lynch SEB Bank/BfG Bank London Business School Prometeia
Nikko Citigroup UBS ITEM Club RASFIN
Nomura Research Institute Westdeutsche Landesbank Morgan Stanley UniCredit Banca Mobiliare
Shinsei Bank/LTCB WGZ Bank Merrill Lynch
Smith Barney Schroders
Sumitomo Life France UBS
Tokai/Sanwa Res/UFJ Inst Credit Commercial de France Williams de Broe
Japan Ctr for Econ Res Natexis Banques Populaires
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Table A1. Impact of IMF Forecasts on Consensus Forecasts, 1994−2003?
A. Current−Year B. Year−Ahead
I. Growth II. Inflation I. Growth II. Inflation
OLS GLS OLSP−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE
G7 Constant −0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.05 −0.01 −0.03 −0.05 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.02 −0.03 −0.05 −0.03 0.03 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.04
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.22) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Lag ( 2) 0.05 0.35 0.28 0.30 0.06 0.28 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.41 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.36 0.34
(0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.20) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Europe Constant −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.01 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.03 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10
(0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.22) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Lag ( 2) 0.05 0.35 0.37 0.38 0.06 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.45 0.46 0.47 0.45 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.20
(0.04) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.20) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10)
Asia−
Pacific
Constant −0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.04 −0.03 −0.10 −0.07 −0.11 −0.08 −0.10 −0.11 0.00 −0.03 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.02 −0.03 −0.05 −0.01 0.03 0.42 0.53 0.53 −0.05 −0.08 −0.07 −0.06 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.20
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.22) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Lag ( 2) 0.05 0.47 0.55 0.57 0.06 0.78 0.89 0.86 0.45 0.39 0.45 0.45 0.78 0.50 0.81 0.81
(0.04) (0.08) (0.10) (0.11) (0.20) (0.52) (0.62) (0.62) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.49) (0.31) (0.36) (0.35)
Latin
America
Constant −0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.05 0.04 −0.18 0.08 −0.09 −0.28 −0.24 −0.26 −0.28 0.37 0.09 0.26 0.37
(0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.21) (0.66) (0.41) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.37) (0.36) (0.66) (0.41)
IMF ( 1 ) −0.02 −0.08 −0.01 0.01 0.03 −0.11 −0.03 −0.03 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
(0.07) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.22) (0.19) (0.27) (0.26) (0.15) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.24) (0.25) (0.29) (0.27)
Lag ( 2) 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.46 0.54 0.46 0.47 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.40
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.20) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.32) (0.32) (0.39) (0.40) (0.32) (0.15) (0.21) (0.22)
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
Table A2. Impact of OECD Forecasts on Consensus Forecasts, 1994−2003?
A. Current−Year B. Year−Ahead
I. Growth II. Inflation I. Growth II. Inflation
OLS GLS OLSP−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE OLS GLS
OLS
P−W GEE
All
OECD
Constant −0.01 −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.02 0.00 −0.03 −0.03 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
OECD ( 1 ) 0.07 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.14 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.15
(0.09) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.13) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Lag ( 2) 0.25 0.37 0.30 0.24 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.52 0.50 0.56 0.52 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.15
(0.13) (0.11) (0.18) (0.19) (0.27) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.19) (0.08) (0.18) (0.16) (0.34) (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)
G7 Constant −0.03 −0.04 −0.02 −0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.01 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
OECD ( 1 ) 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.12) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Lag ( 2) 0.57 0.60 0.59 0.56 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.46 0.27 0.32 0.27 0.27
(0.15) (0.19) (0.16) (0.17) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.21) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09)
Europe Constant −0.02 −0.01 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OECD ( 1 ) 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.11
(0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Lag ( 2) 0.33 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.46 0.35 0.44 0.42 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.33 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.11
(0.11) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.
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